Consciousness, Literature and the Arts
Archive
Volume 6 Number 1, April 2005
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Iseminger, Gary. The Aesthetic Function of Art. Ithaca and London. Cornell University Press, 2004. 160 pages. Cloth ISBN 0-8014-3970-1. Price: $32.50 £18.95
Reviewed by
Indiana University Southeast
“The word aesthetic is no longer a term of abuse and contempt.” This recent announcement by literary critic Dennis Donoghue (Speaking of Beauty, 8) can be equally applied to Gary Iseminger’s latest book, The Aesthetic Function of Art. In fact, the reasoning of Iseminger’s defense of “a version of aestheticism” is contingent upon his acknowledgment of the criticism that has made aestheticism politically and ideologically suspect in the late twentieth century. In a concise introductory chapter to “traditional aestheticism,” Iseminger explains the terms and premises of his theory and gives a brief historical contextualization of his otherwise strictly philosophical, but admirably lucid argument. Most important, he clearly defines from the beginning the central terms for his version of a “new aestheticism”(3) which honors the “compelling intuitions” of the traditional discipline (such as the close connection between art and aesthetics or the distinction between artistically relevant and irrelevant properties); and, at the same time, is designed to meet a list of weighty objections against traditional aestheticism. These objections, which he dispels generally but systematically in the course of the book, range from anti-essentialist to institutionalist, to anti-psychological and to the anti-formalist arguments. Iseminger uses the term “traditional aestheticism” rather broadly, tracing it back to its roots in the mid-eighteenth century and its late-Victorian formalist version (as, for instance, in Clive Bell’s “Significant Form”), but more significantly, he associates it with Monroe Beardsley’s influential aesthetic concept developed in the latter half of the twentieth century.
It is between Beardsley’s definition of art and aesthetic value as independent of social practices and George Dickie’s opposing institutional theory of art that Iseminger builds his precise and plausible argument. The strength of his strategy is its rigorous logical sequencing of premises, conditions, and conclusions, which not only distinguishes between art as a set of products and art and art as informal institution and social practice, but also between the definitions of art and of the aesthetic. These are important distinctions in his line of thought and help separate conceptually the blurring of, for instance, “aesthetic nonart” (such as natural scenes) and “nonaesthetic art” (art that does not aim at aesthetic appreciation), distinctions that cultural or new historicist theories intentionally sublate. Iseminger does not deny the existence of marginal cases or exceptions in his discussion of the aesthetic function of art. On the contrary, his many examples present interesting borderline scenarios and therefore present challenging cases for the reader to test Iseminger’s theory. Since this theory “does not imply that aesthetic values trump over all other values” (130), it does not lead to “taking a particular, extreme variety of appreciation as normative” (116), a defect Iseminger sees in the traditional view of the aesthetic as detached, disinterested contemplation.
Such limiting (and largely formalist) postulates of traditional aestheticism have been the target of many modern and postmodern movements which have hence called upon art “to serve ends beyond the aesthetic” and rejected “many of the values, such as beauty and craftsmanship, traditionally associated with the aesthetic”(136). But Iseminger sees this much belabored “end of art” (for instance announced by Arthur Danto in 1986) as an effect of the change in the institutions and structures supporting and promoting art. Since he assumes that aesthetic communication is a fundamental human impulse, Iseminger is optimistic that even “if the artworld were to be beyond recovery for aesthetic purposes, a new world and practice uniting those who still found value in participating in aesthetic communication would eventually emerge” (137). Iseminger’s optimism is rooted in his assumption that the members of the artworld (whose “master copy” he sees emerging in the eighteenth century) were once in agreement about the function of the practice in which they were engaged. His frequent return to the origins of the aesthetic community in the Western world should not be seen as a sign of nostalgia or dubious historicism. Rather, his circumspect argument acknowledges as a fact the multiple changes in today’s thinking about art and aesthetic value. But it is important for his argument to specify the notion of the aesthetic in its historical dimension which has shaped the current debates about and, especially, in opposition to aestheticism. He thus manages to show that the most suspicious traits of traditional aestheticism--its absolutist and normative definitions based too exclusively on disinterestedness--are matters of definition. His central claim, then, is that the function of the artworld and the practice of art is to promote aesthetic communication is a “matter of contingent fact rather than a matter of necessity or definition” (134).
For cultural and historical critics, Iseminger’s abstract philosophical theory may appear too detached or “disinterested” and therefore suspect. However, Iseminger makes clear that his analytical isolation of art and the aesthetic does not exclude the fact that both can have other functions as well, nor that other institutions can likewise promote aesthetic communication. In fact, it is Iseminger’s introduction of the more culturally and experientially directed concepts “artworld,” “aesthetic appreciation” and “aesthetic communication” into his paradigm which redefines traditional disinterested aesthetics and simultaneously returns to art its primary aesthetic function without attributing to the latter absolute value (as original aesthetic theorists, such as Baumgartner, would have it). Different from many traditional aesthetic theories, Iseminger’s definition of art is not interested in the ut pictura poesis debate, but unifies all art under the heading of “fine arts,” in the manner of 18th-century German aesthetic theories and, as he mentions, Charles Battaux’s “beaux arts.” Nor does Iseminger differentiate between “high” and “popular”culture, a trait that links him at least superficially with recent cultural criticism. But he differs from the latter by not expanding his notion of the “artworld” beyond Western boundaries even though he does not exclude the existence of other artworlds. We may not agree with Iseminger’s centering on Western art and aesthetics as they have existed since the mid-eighteenth century, but since his goal is to reorient philosophical thinking about the aesthetic function of art in the traditional sense, he has to keep the argument tight and precise. To that effect, he constantly reminds the readers of his specific goal, i.e. to reclaim the aesthetic function of art. Thus he manages to remove major oppositions to traditional aestheticism, while at the same time transforming its basic assumptions. The flexibility of his “new aestheticism” is put to a crucial test, for instance, when he addresses the controversial issue of aesthetic value. Unlike older versions of aestheticism, Iseminger’s new paradigm rests on the “aesthetic state of affairs” (36) rather than on aesthetic properties, such as “beauty.” As he puts it, “the apprehension of beauty requires an active sense of the intrinsic, the gratuitous respect for things in themselves or for their own sake” (86). And that is just the premise that he has dispelled plausibly throughout this book. Since he defines the aesthetic function of art as a practice supported and promoted by informal institutions, he relieves the former from its autonomous and essentialist (largely formalist) role. Art and its aesthetic value are not located in the final product but emerge as a result of what he considers a basic human instinct: aesthetic communication. Iseminger presents an argument which accepts the centrality of the aesthetic function of art but gives new weight to the ways in which the practice of art and the informal institution of the artworld promote aesthetic appreciation and communication.
Gary Iseminger’s The Aesthetic Function of Art is an important contribution to contemporary philosophical thinking about art. With both philosophical rigor and gesturing toward cultural changes he helps prepare the theoretical ground for a re-conceptualization of art and the aesthetic, a move that addresses not only the current uncertainties about cultural values but also accommodates changing and maybe unrecognized forms of art. Iseminger’s book is not meant to give final answers, but offers a reasonable and plausible theory of “the structure of reasoning about the value of individual works of art that incorporates an aesthetic account of artistic value” (133).
Works Cited:
Donoghue, Denis. Speaking of Beauty. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2003.