Consciousness, Literature and the Arts
Archive
Volume 6 Number 1, April 2005
___________________________________________________________________
BEYOND CONVENTION:
Border
Crossing From The Social Body To The Porous Body:
The Porous Body As Ontological Site - Interface For A-Located Realities
by
Wimbledon School of Arts
Context:
The
Porous Body
Discussion
of the body is restricted to the role of the body in physical performative
practice, where the body, as opposed to the text driven voice, is given
significance and consideration as the ‘narrator’
in the making of performance.
One’s
conception of the body is fundamental to its management as a tool and structure
of communication within performative practice. The nature of that conception
within one’s practice will influence significantly the potential of the use of
the body as creative element in theatrical performative practice. In the
author’s practice the body is fundamentally a plane of interface for the
emergent devised physical performance and light installation; interface being
the site of access to the performative – the gesture of performance - the site
of the emergence of the phenomenal.
The
body in the author’s practice is experienced as a density of energies, bounded
at a gross optical level by skin, though fundamentally porous and in continual
communication and exchange with its environment.[i]
It is a body, furthermore, whose sentience is distributed not merely throughout
its materiality, the gross and familiar physical body; but, as a consequence of
its inherently and inescapably interactive existence[ii],
is also dispersed and a-located in its relation to and with its immediate
environment, the subtle body[iii].
The
features of the porous body that are fundamental to the nature and functioning
of the body within the author’s practice is developed and discussed
comparatively, through an analysis of the body and its use in the practice of
Butoh. The art of Butoh is a particularly striking and visually distinct example
of physical theatrical practice where the porous body is the sine
qua non of its performative practice marking historically and irrefutably a
significant development in the concept and performing of body within the
practice of physical theatre.
Performance
as ontological practice
a
fetus
walked
along a snow covered path.
it
cleared a path
by
spreading its clothes
upon
the snow
after
removing them
one
by one
as
in a secret
cosmic
ceremony.
then
it peeled off its skin
and
laid that upon the path.
a
whirlwind of snow surrounded it
but
the fetus continued,
wrapped
in this whirlwind.
the
white bones danced
enveloped
by an immaculate cloak.
the
dance of the fetus
which
moved along
as
if carried by a whirlwind of snow
seemed
to be transparent.[iv]
Kazuo
Ono’s dance of the fetus dissolving through the cosmos in a dance of porosity
that subverts substantially the idea of the material and of materiality, (its
own and that of its environment), is, the author suspects, not simply a poetic
allusion to the spirit of the dance and of Butoh. It is rather, the author
argues an expression of the materiality of an experience of the embodied voice
of Butoh.[v]
The stark imagery embodied in Kazuo Ono’s dance of the fetus; its porous
archeology of the structures of self and of nature; the cosmic backdrop to the
narrative; the intense focus and Zen-like act of being both perform and express
this very act of digging deep into the structures of being. This ontological
practice is at the very core and heart of the nature of Butoh. Practice as ontology, an existential enquiry into performance
and its role as a form of knowledge, lies also at the heart of this author’s
practice and is fundamental to the conception, materiality and nature of the
porous body.
The
body in Butoh, irretrievably in the act of becoming, outside of time, space and
culture, is a body that is materially and substantially disengaged from the body
of ordinary social living and its discourse with self, other and society.
The
body in Butoh is managed, materially and substantively, in a manner that is
mindful specifically of the purpose that this body in Butoh might inhabit a
place and a space that is beyond the dimension and context of conventional,
normal and normalizing social discourse.
Text:
The
Porous Body as Ontological site – Interface for A-located Realities
The
body in Butoh functions as both a place and a space where the interface between
the individual and the cosmic, between the ‘present’ and living and the
‘absent’ and the dead in some way merge to spawn an emergent ‘now’ which
is both beyond time and space: an a-located reality which exists as a
consequence of this individual/cosmic interface, and which can, furthermore,
exist only because it is outside of time and space.
This
emergent ‘now,’ beyond time and space, the a-located reality, to which the
author refers is not the now of the present instant, ‘the one that tries to
hold itself between the future and the past, and gets devoured by them,’[vi] nor is it the now that emerges from an attempt ‘to
constitute time on the basis of consciousness.’[vii] The emergent ‘now’ spawned by the body in Butoh
in a state of porosity which becomes/effects an interface suspended somewhere
from within self and its environment (cosmos), may be likened to the now
referred to by the artist Barnett Newman.[viii]
Newman’s now, Lyotard
explains, is ‘no more that now.’ It
is ‘a stranger to consciousness and cannot be constituted by it.’ The
emergent ‘now’ from the Butoh body in a state of presence and porosity
cannot be constituted through cognitive consciousness or intelligence. Rather,
as Lyotard argues of Newman’s now, the ‘now’ of the Butoh body in a state of presence and
porosity ‘is what dismantles consciousness, what deposes consciousness, it is
what consciousness cannot formulate, and even what consciousness forgets in
order to constitute itself.’[ix]
This
‘now’ so detrimental to [cognitive] consciousness, but clearly so present to
sight and experience from the site of Newman’s canvas and from the site and
the horizon of the interface of the porous body of Butoh is the unharmonizable,
the author ventures to suggest, that Lyotard seeks to reserve. This ‘now,’
uncomposable within [cognitive] consciousness, indeed decomposing consciousness
as we know it, brings in some altereity, some Other. Might it be that this
‘now,’ the Other, bears witness to that which exists within the value of man
that the humanists failed to interrogate: the inhuman to which Lyotard refers[x];
the message from the dead to which Hijikata and the practitioner of Butoh
constantly allude; possibly even the gesture of the work of art?[xi]
The ‘now’ that is beyond the defining and limiting factors of cognitive
consciousness is, the author suggests, that ‘now’ which ‘the system,’
[the social body contrived through practices] ‘has the consequence of causing
the forgetting of what escapes it.’[xii]
The anamnesis drawn forth in the ‘now’ by the porous body in Butoh and in
the author’s practice - brought about as a consequence of incessant becoming
though the body’s porosity in performativity - answers ‘the anguish…..of a
mind haunted by the familiar and unknown guest which is agitating it, sending it
delirious but also making it think…;’[xiii]
causing it even to seek delirium for the sake of the hallucinated body that
resides within. This mind haunted by the familiar and unknown guest agitating
from within is the mind [cognitive consciousness] of the social body contrived
in practices. The anamnesis brought forth by the porous body may be ‘the
remainder’[xiv] which one suspects that Lyotard silently hopes is
present, though lost, within the social body contrived in practices; the body
that is silenced, the body that is made mute by the language that separates man
from himself. This anamnesis knocks on the door, awakens the remainder [that
infinitely secret one of which the soul is a hostage][xv] within the social [constructed] body of ‘the living
being who, in language, separates and opposes himself to his own bare life and,
at the same time, maintains himself in relation to that bare life in an
inclusive exclusion.’[xvi]
When
the ‘now’ of the porous body, visible through the interface consequent upon
the passibility of the porous body that is suspended in an a-located space of
representation, deconstructs the very consciousness [cognitive] of the social
body that seeks to apprehend it, how might one proceed without the appropriation
and comfort of nostalgic forms? It is Lyotard’s plea that we ‘be witness to
the unpresentable.’ ‘Let us activate the differences and save the honor of
the name,’ he suggests.[xvii]
May the artist bear witness to the unpresentable without nostalgia, unlike the
language of modernism, whose very form, ‘because of its recognizable
consistency, continues to offer…[us]….matter for solace and pleasure,’[xviii]
and which therefore fails by its very nostalgia to present the
unpresentable. It is the postmodern artist, according to Lyotard’s argument,
that is capable of representation without nostalgia, who produces works that
‘are not in principle governed by preestablished rules..[that]…cannot be
judged according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to
the text or to the work.’ It is those very rules, not yet existent, ‘that
the work of art itself is looking for,’ he emphasizes.[xix]
Following Lyotard one would have therefore to agree that ‘the postmodern would
be that which, in the modern, puts forward the unpresentable in presentation
itself; that which denies itself the solace of good forms, the consensus of a
taste which would make it possible to share collectively the nostaligia for the
unattainable; that which searches for new presentations, not in order to enjoy
them but in order to impart a stronger sense of the unpresentable.’[xx]
One might reasonably conclude, therefore, the artist’s task to be to discover
those very rules not yet existent. In her artistic practice the author considers
this task from the perspective and the level of the exploration of the body as
ontological site, in a state of passibility, of porosity. This is the substance
and the focus of her investigation of the Other, of the Inhuman, of the Residue,
that which cannot be constructed through cognitive consciousness; the momentary
flash on the grid. Artistic practice may only ever create the grid, the trace.
The artist cannot construct nor anticipate the form or content of that momentary
flash on the grid, the gesture, that brings with it an altereity, a lucidity
that escapes the language that created it. The artist’s craft and discernment
is therefore merely to perfect the grid, through the divination of craft, so
that the altereity, the lucidity, might appear. And create such a space of
representation that such lucidity might be intractable; that severe lucidity for
which Artaud sought within his Theatre of Cruelty.
To
be – the
ontological task of art
‘When
we have been abandoned by meaning,’ as indeed we have when we
are present in that a-located space of representation that deconstructs
consciousness, Lyotard’s suggestion is that, ‘the artist has the
professional duty to bear witness that there
is, to respond to the order to be…….Being announces itself in the
imperative,’ he argues. ‘Art is not a genre defined in terms of an end (the
pleasure of the addressee), and still less is it a game whose rules have to be
discovered. It accomplishes an ontological task,’ ‘It accomplishes it
without completing it. It must constantly begin to testify anew to the
occurrence by letting the occurrence be,’ Lyotard insists,’[xxi]
‘It is the task of writing, thinking, literature, arts, to venture to bear
witness to it.’[xxii] The a-location of the space of representation
created by the interface of the porous body in a state of presence in the
‘now’ accomplishes this ontological task in the practice of Butoh and in the
author’s works Performed Geometries, through the incessant becoming of the
body in a state of porosity sited within the catachrestic space of its own
emergence as interface in the ‘now.’ The porous body in Butoh and in the
author’s artistic practice, accomplishes this ontological task through, and
only through, the author suggests, its [the porous body’s] state of
a-location.
If
it is indeed the case that that the porosity of the body in Butoh and in the
author’s practice residing in ‘presence’ in the ‘now,’ within that
interface emergent upon its performativity, is that which accomplishes the
ontological task of discovering those ‘rules,’ not yet existent, by which we
might ‘know’ [it is with caution that the author refers to such an
established epistemological methodology], what then is meant by the body in
presence? How can the body full of holes, hallucinating from within itself – a
necessary condition to witness the unrepresentable, the gesture – at the same
time, or through that very condition, be present? And why must the [cognitive]
consciousness of the social body contrived in practices find it so necessary to
forget its own remembering? What absolute tragedy resides within the social body
entrapped within its own ‘system’ and language[s]? What sight is so
unbearable as to cause its own forgetting? What makes incessant becoming of the
porous body full of holes surmount and overturn the forgetting of an absolute
tragedy? What resides within the nature of the porous body and its border
crossing, from the social body into an ontological site of visibility, that
which this author calls the interface, that causes such material and critical
re-ordering and re-alignment of the space of representation?
Presence
as representational practice
‘Presence
is the instant which interrupts the chaos of history and which recalls, or
simply calls out that ‘there is’, even before that which is has any
signification.’[xxiii]
‘An
event, an occurrence – what Martin Heideggar called ein
Ereignis - is infinitely simple, but this simplicity can only be approached
through a state of privation. That which we call thought must be disarmed.’[xxiv]
Presence
and the absence of landscape reside in the same space of representation when
that representation emerges as a function of the body as ontological site and
not as reflective mirror. When what is being represented is unrepresentable.
When representation ceases to be mere mimesis. When representation becomes the
site, the place and the space of a construction of meaning, a dynamic site of
becoming. The kind of representation to which Kobialka refers as ‘the labor to
compose place which will articulate the ensemble of movements and operations
within it, a labor which collates heterogeneous place on the same plane; a labor
that is a practice of space identification and the production of place.’ A
dynamic site that does not erase those very objects that it seeks to present,
those familiar but unknown guests, which when pursued through the practice of
mimesis are, however, erased by that very pursuit. The ‘presence’ of the
porous body in Butoh and in the author’s artistic practice, borrowing once
more from Kobialka’s words, hopes ‘to disclose representational practices
that might have been erased by us in the pursuit of objects caught in the mirror
that we placed in front of ourselves.’[xxv]
The porous body in the author’s practice is an attempt to create such a space
that might reveal such practices. It is an attempt at a reconciliation of
existence and signification, where presence as a representational practice is a
mode of thinking[/being] and not a mode of presentation.
When
presence as a representational practice establishes a space of representation
where ‘the only ‘response’ to the question of the abandoned,’ as Lyotard
would ask it, abandoned that is, in the absence of meaning… ‘that has ever
been heard is not Know why,
but Be.’[xxvi]
Where the only response to ‘to be,’
if it wishes to be that instant of presence which interrupts the chaos of
history, is ‘to be ‘ outside the confines of time and place, those signifying
confines called the social and the historical. When ‘to be ,’ if it is
enacted within time and place will simply become one, of many varieties, of
socio-historical prescriptions. When ‘to
be ‘ is enacted outside of time and place - its emergent face, visible and
open to be experienced - becomes
‘a prescription emanating from silence or from the void.’ The ‘to
be’ enacted outside the
confines of time and place ‘perpetuates the passion by reiterating it from its
beginnings,’[xxvii]
by contrast to the ‘to be’ within
time and place which becomes merely a reenactment. To
be enacted outside of time and
place is the subflatus experienced through timbre rather than sound. Sound, by
contrast to timbre, in being constructed and harmonized, is enslaved to time and
place, its ineluctable fate when delivered through the hand of the human. To
be is the subflatus by contrast to sound; the inhuman by contrast to the
human; the passibility of the hallucinated and porous body by contrast to the
social body constructed through practices, entrapped and enslaved by those very
practices, forever silenced, made mute, separated and opposed to his own bare
life by those very practices. The passability and the porosity of the body in
‘presence,’ the body astonished by its own ingenuity, that body in a state
of severe lucidity, as a consequence, becomes, a backdrop to all places. That
backdrop to all places, performing not the horizon, but becoming a presence
accessed and thus experienced; that backdrop where ‘no line separates earth
from sky, which are of the same substance.’[xxviii]
When
‘to be’ is
enacted, or rather, when a space is created from within which ‘to
be ‘ might emerge performatively, then ‘to
be’ becomes. Quite simply, as
an event, an occurrence, it becomes, incessantly, and without prescription. It
is in this condition and in such a space of representation that passibility
becomes a possibility; when identity, which pays homage to an order, is
deconstructed. Identity is a stranger to passability and cannot be constituted
by it. Identity is dismantled by the passibility of the porous body. It is
deposed by it. Identity is what passibility cannot formulate. Identity is what
passibilility forgets in order to constitute itself. When a space of
representation is created through the passability of the porous body where ‘to
be’ may emerge to a plane of
visibility, then identity can no longer freeze the gesture of thinking, to
borrow from Michel de Certeau’s form of declamation.[xxix]
When a space of representation is created through the passability of the porous
body perched precariously in the ‘now,’ where the enactment of ‘to
be’ is ‘a prescription emanating from the void’ which ‘perpetuates
the passion by reiterating it from its beginnings,’ then, in the spirit of de
Certeau, to ‘think,’ ‘on the contrary, is to pass through; is to
question that order, to marvel that it exists, to wonder what made it possible,
to seek, in passing over this landscape, traces of the movement that formed it,
to discover in these histories supposedly laid to rest, “how and to what
extent it would be possible to think otherwise”.’[xxx]
The
creation of such a space of representation, a dynamic site of passibility
allowing for possibility means ‘approaching presence without recourse to a
means of presentation.’[xxxi]
It is in this space of passibility, this emergent interface of visibility, that
the ‘immaterial,’ the ‘an-objectable’ in Lyotard terminology, may be
allowed. This emergence, this ‘matter’ is, to borrow from Lyotard’s
argument, ‘ ‘immaterial, an-objectable, because it can only ‘take place’
or find its occasion at the price of suspending these active powers of the
mind;’ by contrast to the ‘matter’ subject to sensibility which is made
intelligible to understanding in that it accommodates a form, faculty or
capacity of the mind.[xxxii]
It is necessary to suspend the active states of mind in order for the body to
bear witness, to be ‘in presence,’ beyond ‘the sense of the here-and-now’.[xxxiii]
When the body is in ‘presence,’ beyond the sense of here-and-now, when there is a mindless state, necessary so that the
[cognitive] mind might not grasp, perceive or conceive matter.
Then the body is in a state of
passibility where there is possibility, emergence,
’so that there be something.’[xxxiv]
This
‘matter,’ this ‘there is,’ this ‘quod’ to which Lyotard refers, this ‘presence’ in the porous
body filled with holes, ‘ designate[s] an event of a passion, a passibility
for which the mind will not have been prepared, which will have unsettled it,
and of which it conserves only the feeling …… of an obscure debt’[xxxv]
to a familiar yet unknown guest knocking at the door. The residue, the inhuman,
the familiar yet unknown guest is resident though not recognized, nor referred,
let alone revered, within the social body contrived by practice. This presence
is the event of the instant, (though the author hesitates to refer to the time
based instant lest it confound), that interrupts the chaos of history, that
makes a ‘visibility’ ‘with-out’ meaning, that creates an experiential
a-location performatively that is the living and dynamic ‘being-in’ ‘to
be.’ This a-location of the event ‘with-out’ meaning, a-located
beyond the grasping cognitive mind of the body contrived by social practices, is
an event within passibility; it is the being and witnessing of there
is,’ even before that which is has any signification. This a-location of
the event, ‘with-out’ meaning, is the transcendence of
‘presence’ ‘always already caught in a signification.’[xxxvi]
This space of representation created through the a-location of the event
‘with-out’ meaning, the interface, that space of the porous body where the
state of passability creates the possibility that to
be might emerge, is, the author suggests, ‘the barrier resistant to
signification.’[xxxvii]
This
event that interrupts the chaos of history that is here called ‘presence,’
resides in a landscape without horizon. There is no line which ‘separates
earth from sky, which are of the same substance’ in this landscape.[xxxviii]
This event which interrupts the chaos of history, the a-located performativity
of the porous body in Butoh and in the author’s artistic practice,
‘with-out’ meaning, is, the author suggests, an event of absolute lucidity,
bearing no prescription. A state of absolute lucidity that may be likened to the
severe lucidity for which Artaud sought in his Theatre of Cruelty. It is an
event which bears no prescription. It is therefore, at the border and a barrier
to signification.
Absolute
lucidity challenges the deity, the theodicity of representational forms.
Absolute lucidity challenges the theodicity of the consolation of correct forms.
It brings in the precariousness of incessant becoming – a constant state of no
fixed points. It offers no consolation. It allows no relation, to the mind,
petrified through its own practices and languages that oppose it to its very
being. When mind no longer requires consolation, or has an inability to be
nullified by consolation, then it might exist and marvel, even wonder at the
landscape through which it passes, yet can never recognize. Then in thinking
otherwise it might even locate that movement that formed it, (beyond time and
space). It might even, if not overwhelmed by wonder apprehend its own
beginnings, and in so doing, re-unite itself with its own origins. Such wonder,
such marvel, such unity, must surely console – but without nostalgia - for
there exists no fixed points to which nostalgia might refer.
Absolute
tragedy George Steiner argues is a negative ontology.[xxxix]
Absolute lucidity by contrast bears the potential of a positive ontology.[xl]
The vision of absolute tragedy is scarcely endurable, and thus its presentation
can only be fragmentary.[xli]
‘Only nothingness is acquitted of the fault, of the error of being,’ that
which is absolute tragedy.[xlii]
If one challenges, for the moment the idea of the certainty of nothingness as
expressed by Steiner – the absence of aberrant life, a negative prescription
– and assert in its stead the nothingness of the void, where nothingness
becomes instead a possibility, the pregnant possibility of the
prescription from the void - then the hermetic messenger of lucidity, far from
being nothing[ness] is pregnant with everything, merely awaiting form, merely
awaiting that momentary flash on the grid that might give it visibility.
Absolute
lucidity, the author therefore suggests, is an ontological anticipation that
seeks merely ‘visibility’ in-being. To
be, incessantly is a necessity. To
be is an imperative. Absolute lucidity, in the performative act is
fragmentary not because the vision is less than bearable, but because the
unknown guest is unknown (though present), because the unknown guest is occluded
(by mind). It is mind that finds the vision of absolute lucidity unbearable,
because there is no place for mind to reside within its landscape. The landscape
of absolute lucidity is too vertiginous for mind to find any foothold
whatsoever. This landscape of absolute lucidity ‘draws its forces [what the
landscape has ‘already] up against the mind, and that in drawing them up, it
has broken and deposed the mind (as one deposes a sovereign), made it vomit
itself up towards the nothing-ness [even no-thing-ness] of being-there.’[xliii]
The
absolute tragedy for the mind in absolute lucidity is not to
be. In the landscape of
absolute lucidity the mind is ‘with-out’
language. It is mind, and not man, that is unhoused in absolute lucidity. The
void in absolute lucidity is not mute. It is merely that language, and the
system of mind that sustains language is dissolved within it. In so doing,
another ‘language’ might emerge. The timbre as opposed to the sound might
emerge and its resonance be experienced through the passability and porosity of
that space of absolute lucidity. When first deposed, the body ‘with-out’
language appears mute and unhoused. It is, however, simply, ‘with-out’
language, ‘with-out’ [cognitive] mind. The void is ‘with-out’ defining
landscape. The void is ‘with-out’ meaning because it dissolves language and
the system of mind that sustains language and meaning. Language has no medium
within which it (or the mind) might ‘precipitate’ in the void. The void
without landscape in absolute lucidity bears no prescriptive nor signifying
marks that might cloud, or create a narrative which would cover over that
landscape that may be ‘seen’ but not recognized. That landscape which is a
becoming, that landscape which is pure matter [as Lyotard argues as opposed to
form].
‘It
is not estrangement [from language and from mind] that procures
landscape,’ Lyotard argues, ‘It is the other way around.’[xliv] It is landscape that procures estrangement. It is
the ‘absent’ landscape, the landscape without signifier, that landscape of
absolute and complete lucidity that erases language and the mind. Not through a
sensorial transfer from one field to another but ‘by
the implosion of forms themselves, and forms are mind.’[xlv]
‘A landscape is a mark,’ Lyotard reasons, ‘and it [the landscape] (but not
the mark it makes and leaves) should be thought of, not as an inscription, but
as the erasure of support. If anything remains, it is an absence which
stands as a sign of a horrifying presence in which mind FAILS and misses its
aim. Fails, not because it was looking for itself and did not find itself,
but’ fails, and here Lyotard searches for comparisons to illucidate his
meaning, ’in the sense that one can say that one missed one’s footing and
fell, or that one’s legs gave way, as one sits on a bench, watching a window
which is lit up but empty.’[xlvi]
The author suggests than mind did not fail because it faltered. It failed
because it was dissolved. Mind failed not because it was displaced, but because
it cannot exist within a landscape devoid of signifiers. There is no place in
which mind may reside in the landscape of absence, that catachrestic space of
passability and porosity. Thus the power of the landscape of absence to dissolve
mind and the language[s] it sustains ‘really makes itself felt in the sense
that it interrupts narratives.’[xlvii]
These
landscapes of absence, ‘landscapes’ devoid of ‘narratives,’ do not exist
topographically. They are not prescribed as a consequence of the ‘chronography
of the mark that is landscape.’[xlviii]
Such landscapes do not come together to make up history and a geography, Lyotard
explains. They do not even have family likenesses. They are not even the product
of an imaginary space-time, he insists. They have nothing to do with imagination
in the normal sense of the word he argues. They are not even a free synthesis of
forms. Rather, ‘where and when they happen is not signalled. They are half
seen, half touched, and they blind and they anaesthetize. A PLAINT of matter (of
the soul), about the nets in which the mind incarcerates it.’[xlix]
‘A landscape is an excess of presence……... A glimpse of the
inhuman………Is it still a form of order, a different form of order?’
Lyotard asks ……. ‘A
displacement of the vanishing point? A vanishing of standpoint, rather?’,[l]
he suggests.
This
landscape of absolute lucidity is opposed to the landscape of optical geometry,
of the landscape of perspective and of representation. ‘Optical geometry, the
ordering of values and colours in line with a Neoplatonically inspired
hierarchism, …….. helped to encourage the identification of new political
communities: the city, the State, the nation, by giving them the destiny of
seeing everything and of making the world transparent (clear and distinct) to
monocular vision.’ Lyotard explains. ‘Once placed on the perspectivist
stage, the various components of the communities……. were put in order under
the eye of the painter, thanks to the costruzione
legittima. And in turn the eye of the monarch, positioned as indicated by
the vanishing-point, receives this universe thus placed in order…..The modern
notion of culture is born in the public access to the signs of historico-political
identity and their collective deciphering……..it organizes his [the modest
citizen’s] space of identification’[li]
But
let us re-member, there has been a displacement of vanishing point in this
landscape without narrative, the landscape of absolute lucidity, even a
vanishing of standpoint altogether. Let us remember, as Lyotard pleads, or even
re-member as is the attempt in the author’s practice, ‘the INNOCENCE of
walking’ that is forgotten, through that countenance uncovered by the
landscape [the landscape devoid of narrative, the landscape of absolute
lucidity] and attempt to restrain the intrusion of prescription, restrain that
law which ‘takes a grip on the gaze. …[for]…... The law sends
signals across what was once a landscape….’[lii]
‘Brief
silence, the angel is passing.’ is Lyotard’s plea.[liii]
‘Be
careful. What if he were a messenger? Then they will make sure he is remembered,
domesticated,’ is his caution.[liv]
‘Domestic
language is rhythmic,’ Lyotard concludes, ‘Rhythmed wisdom protects itself
against pleonexia, the delirium of a
growth with no return, a story with no pause for breath……’[lv]
‘The domus is the space-time of this
reiteration.[lvi]
In
that case, may we no longer be forever hostage within that domus. May we,
rather, be unhoused, forever lost, traveling
through this landscape. May we be no longer hostage to the social body contrived
in practices, that is absolute tragedy. May we re-member, once more, the
innocence of walking through landscape, in-passability, in-porosity,
in-presence, in the, no longer vertiginous,
‘now.’ That is absolute lucidity.
1.
An
understanding of the author’s concept of the interactive and sentient
physical body and its interconnectedness to and with its environment may be
approached through the idea of the PostHuman Condition. See, for example,
Robert Pepperell’s concept of the ‘fuzzy human.’ See Robert Pepperell,
The Posthuman Condition. Consciousness
beyond the Brain, (Bristol: intellect tm, 2003) , 21 - where Pepperell
argues that “ Our bodies consist in a complex matrix of senses that
perpetually respond to the stimuli and demands of the environment. Since a
human cannot be separated from its supportive environment for any length of
time without coming to harm….it seems the human is a ‘fuzzy edged’
entity that is profoundly dependent on its surroundings, much as the brain
is dependent on the body.’ Pepperell recognizes how “ deeply integrated
into our environments we are. Because of this perpetual exchange between the
living organism and its surroundings,” he argues, “ there can be no
fixed state of a living human. Ultimately
we may never know the human as anything more than an approximation – a
contingent nexus of substances and events…….neither
bounded by skin nor isolated from the environment we are woven into, and
woven of.[The emphasis is the author’s.]
[ii]See
also Hayles’s discussion on the interactive nature of the body and
consciousness - N. Katherine Hayles, “Flesh and Metal: Reconfiguring the
Mindbody in Virtual Environments,”Semiotic
Flesh: Information and the Human Body, eds., Phillip Thurtle &
Robert Mitchell, (University of Washington, Seattle: Walter Chapin Simpson
Center for the Humanities, 2002), 52-68.
[iii]
The author employs the term subtle body to refer to the physical and
material body at a level of activity, sensation and perception that is
proximal, that is, at the cellular and inter-cellular level. The subtle body
in this definition exists within the gross and familiar level of physical
body as well as within the space surrounding the body, which in some
practices is referred to as the aura. The author’s concept of the subtle
body is paralleled in practices such as Chi-Gung, where the body and its
energy is conceived of and described as, “ a subtle organizing energy
field’ (SOEF), a dynamic force field that organizes the energies and
elements within it into the integrated organic systems required to sustain
any form of life. In human, for example, the SOEF organizes the atomic
elements and energies into the form of the human body according to the
design contained in the master template of DNA. Such energy fields are
associated with all living organisms and represent the only force in the
universe that resists the law of entropy i.e., the dissolution of all
compound matter. These living energy fields therefore sustain organic life
in material forms, but only as long as they maintain a state of dynamic
polarity and constantly recharge and rebalance themselves by resonating in
synchronicity with higher force fields…..,”
Daniel Reid, Chi-Gung.
Harnessing the Power of the Universe, (London: Simon & Schuster,
1998), 69.
[iv]
Kazuo Ono, from “The Dead
Begin to Run”, Butoh. Dance of the
Dark Soul, Mark Holborn, (New York: Sardev/Aperture, 1978), 36.
[v]
The term Butoh is here used to embrace collectively the various
manifestations of practitioners who follow in the lineage of Hijikata and
his philosophy of the body and of ‘dance,’ and not as an indication of a
unifying or unified practice or philosophy that constitutes Butoh. This
would be quite contrary to Tatsumi Hijikata’s anarchic and subversive
attitude in Butoh, and the highly individualist or singular (though cosmic)
aspect to the embodied experience of Butoh.
[vi]
Jean-François Lyotard, The Inhuman, trans., Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby,
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991), 90.
[vii]
This now, Lyotard states is ‘one
of the temporal ‘ecstasies’ that has been analyzed since Augustine’s
day, and particularly since Edmund Huserl…’ (Lyotard, The Inhuman, 90)
[viii]
As, for example, in his artistic work especially the series The
Stations of the Cross, and in his essay The
Sublime is Now.
[ix]
Lyotard, Inhuman, 90.
[x]
Lyotard ‘s argument with humanism shows it to assume that ‘man were a
certain value, which has no need to be interrogated.’ He asks the
question, ‘What if human beings, in humanism’s sense, were in the
process of, constrained into, becoming inhuman….’ And ‘what if what is
‘proper’ to humankind were to be inhabited by the inhuman?’ He notes
Appolinaire ingenuous observation that more than anything, artists are men
who want to become inhuman; and Adorno’s more prudent view that ‘art
remains loyal to humankind uniquely through its inhumanity in regard to
it.’ And he cautions that we
do not confuse ‘the inhumanity of the system which is currently being
consolidated under the name of development (amongst others)’ with ‘the
infinitely secret one of which the soul is hostage.’ (Lyotard, The
Inhuman, 2)
[xi]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 1.
[xii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 2.
[xiii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 2.
[xiv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 3.
[xv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman,2..
[xvi]
Agamben, Georgio, Homo Sacer.
Sovereign Power and Bare Life, trans., Daniel Heller-Roazen,
(Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), 8.
[xvii]
Jean-François Lyotard, The Postmodern
Condition, Theory and History of Literature, trans., Geoff Bennington
and Brian Massumi, Volume 10, (Manchester: Manchester University Press,
1989), 82)
[xviii]Lyotard,
The Postmodern Condition, 81.
[xix]
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition,91.
[xx]
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition,
81.
[xxi]
Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition,88.
(The emphasis is the author’s.)
[xxii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 7.
[xxiii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 87.
[xxiv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 90.
[xxv]
Kobialka is here referring to his pursuit of medieval practices of
representation embodied within the Regularis Concordia. See Michal Kobialka,
This is my Body. Representational Practices in the Early Middle Ages,
(Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1999), viii.
[xxvi]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 87.
[xxvii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 88.
[xxviii]
Gilles Deleuze, “Nomad Art: Space”, The
Deleuze Reader, ed. With introduction by Constantin V. Boundas, (New
York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 167.
[xxix]
Michel de Certeau, Heterologies. Discourses on the Other, trans., Brian Massumi, Theory
and History of Literature, Volume 17 (Minneapolis : University of Minnesota
Press, 2000), 194.
[xxx]
Kobialka, This is my Body, 1.
[xxxi]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 139.
[xxxii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140.
[xxxiii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140.
[xxxiv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140.
[xxxv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 140-141.
[xxxvi]
Giorgio Agamben, Word and Phantasm in
Western Culture, trans., Ronal L. Martinez, Stanzas. Theory and History
of Literature, Volume 69, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1993), 156. Agamben argues in his essay “The Barrier and the fold,” that
‘the original experience be always already caught in a fold, be already
simple in the etymological sense (sim-plex,
“once pleated”) that presence be already caught in signification: this
is precisely the origin of western metaphysics.’
[xxxvii]
Agamben, Word and Phantasm in Western
Culture, 156.
[xxxviii]
Deleuze, “Nomad Art: Space”, The
Deleuze Reader, 167.
[xxxix]
George Steiner, No Passion Spent, (London: Faber & Faber, 1996), 129.
[xl]
May George Steiner pardon this alignment of absolute lucidity to his
argument of absolute tragedy especially in view of the historic context
within which he places his argument, of what he calls a century of a
carnival of bestiality.
[xli]
Steiner, No Passion Spent, 130.
[xlii]
Steiner, No Passion Spent, 129.
[xliii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 188.
[xliv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 199.
[xlv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 199. (The
emphasis is the author’s)
[xlvi]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 199. (The
emphasis is the author’s)
[xlvii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 187.
[xlviii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 190.
[xlix]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 190.
[l]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 187.
[li]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 119-120.
[lii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 190.
[liii]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 193.
[liv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 193.
[lv]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 192.
[lvi]
Lyotard, The Inhuman, 193.