Consciousness, Literature and the Arts
Archive
Volume 11 Number 1, April 2010
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Into the Eyes of the “I Clown“: A Metaphor for the Subconscious Imagination
By
Bergen Community College
In his classic study The Fool and His Scepter (1969) Willeford writes, “The self-division that we sense in the fool is made, partly by means of projection, to correspond to the division between fool and non fool. The relations between them are reconstituted at a distance from us, thus giving us the feeling that the fool’s show will adequately contain any dangers that the fool holds for the non fool.” (pp. 42 & 44) He also describes the reaction of people generally to everyday fools rather than showmen. “Most of the people we recognize as fools experience the world and act within it in ways that indicate a fundamental abnormality… of psychic functioning.” (p. 23) Indeed, he goes on to explain how the psychological profile of mental illnesses such as schizo-phrenia contain abnormal kinds of functioning in that, among other things, “…one does not perceive, understand, and act in accordance with things as they really are…” (p. 23) What is interesting here is the difference made between “the show” and the “non show“, between what is presumed abnormal versus true abnormality. In the former, one is invited to have a chaotic, contradictory mental state as a valued asset. In the latter, one is viewed as psychologically weak, disintegrated and in need of professional help. The psychological intricacy of these ideas reflects the work of what this author refers to as the “subconscious imagination”. The mind (whether just one or many simultaneously acting as one) can creatively present the self to itself in ways that seem detached from irrationality, but are not. It is through this distortion process that the self has its chance to indulge in and revel in what it is as whole, and by its very nature. Indeed, Willeford states, “The costume of the fool actor…expresses…qualities of the fool’s inner life…for example…weak logic and a poor grasp of formal pattern…his costume suggests the disorder that is an important part of the experience of non fools that is one of the links between him and the fool actor.“ (p. 21) So, like the non fool must somehow be made to relate to the fool, the fool must somehow be made relate to the non fool.
Send in the “I Clown”
According to Willeford, the clown is senseless or irrational “specifically with regard to social decorum” (Willeford p. 12). Thus, the clown image can be characterized as a foolish social “self” standing in the very crowd that collectively represents the normal, logical, rational “self”. How might these two selves, the fool and non fool, relate to one another in such a way as to merge into one metaphoric representation of the clown in the crowd? And, how might they do so in such a way as to seem, essentially, like two opposing selves agreeing to meet on a whim? Indeed, this psychological effect may come about through the rather subtle, interactive energies of constraint and need. According to Modell (2003), “…the self is constrained by its own vital needs, and the degree to which it is constrained will in turn limit the complexity that characterizes the image of the other.” (p. 117) With regard to the two selves of the metaphor termed the I Clown, each is understood to be at a necessary psychological distance from the other, even when physically side by side. In addition, this author (2008) describes needs as central to the imaginative interpretation of figures. Some poets such as Roethke and McKay have created “dollified” images of human girls and women, using their physical features, e.g., hair, body form, to objectify and project them into their own personal scenarios. This author writes, “…a physically appealing female subject may become “dollified” when desirable human psychic qualities are projected onto her by an admirer. This admirer projects a psychological profile onto her in order to establish certain social and emotional relations between the self and “the doll” that is highly personal.” (p.132) Again, with regard to the I Clown, each self becomes the desired portrayal of the other, irrationality for rationality and vice versa. Metaphorically speaking, the source domain includes the crowd or collective self, the visual gestalt or clown him-or herself, and the psychological distance that divides the non fool and fool. The target domain includes the duality of sense/nonsense that exists as a “whole” of human nature, as well as the human need to express this duality of nature in a constrained way. This latter domain is expressed using particular instances of creative imagery.
The purpose of this paper is to characterize the metaphoric mapping of these two domains to create an intricate image complex. This morphing process involves neurocognitive networks of the brain and mind that include a nuanced visual sense, laced with conscious and subconscious feelings and thoughts that become projected outward as a detailed metaphoric image. This image becomes a prime example of how sensation, perception, and memory come together to satisfy the human desire to connect our conscious and subconscious selves.
A Nuanced Visual Sense
Recent research supports the idea that subconscious attention directs involuntary movements of the eyeballs referred to as micro saccades (Martinez-conde and Macknik, 2007; Engbert and Kliegal, 2003; Hofed and Clark, 2002). According to Martinez-Conde and Macknik (2007), “…the direction of micro saccades is biased toward objects to which people are unconsciously attracted…Even when your gaze is fixed, your attention can unconsciously shift about a visual scene to objects that attract your interest…”. (pp. 56 & 62). In addition, recent studies of motivated gazing indirectly support the unintended influence of private feelings on visual experience (Light and Isaacowitz, 2006). Researchers have found that older childless women “avert their gaze” from images of human babies more quickly than do young childless women. They have stated, “…Gaze appeared to be more closely tied to goal processes than to affective outcomes…the life-span theory of control would argue that any affective results of motivated information-processing are adaptive only if they facilitate achievement of behavioral outcomes…” (Isaacowitz, 2006, p.71)). These statements imply that subconscious feelings are capable of imposing themselves on cognitive control processes, potentially disrupting the achievement of personal psychological goals, e.g., working to develop a positive self image as a childless woman who can no longer bare children. In addition, there is evidence of brain activity in a structure known as the amygdala during subconscious emotional processing of visual stimuli. It has been found that perceiving a slide of a face becomes subliminally associated with an earlier unpleasant sound through the application of the backward masking technique (Morris et al, 1998).
Evans (2001) characterizes attention as a “mental spotlight”. The author states, “Spotlights can be more or less focused…When we are relaxed, and not in the grip of any particular emotion, our mental spotlight is relatively unfocused, and more thoughts may drift through out awareness.” (p.113) This implies that gazing is a dynamic act that includes bouts of both conscious and subconscious processing. Indeed, the relatively unfocused mental spotlight may function as a loosened pressure valve through which normally hidden feelings flow over into conscious awareness. This may allow the thought to take many initial forms, including those having to do with physical distance, vibrancy of color, eccentricity of movement, or intensity of emotion. At the same time, this mental haziness may make capturing the true nature of a developing image by any single viewer more difficult. Merleau-Ponty (1964) believes that the accurate perception of a thing involves knowing its essence. He states, “In order to grasp an essence, we consider a concrete experience, and then we make it change in our thought, trying to imagine it as effectively modified in all respects. That which remains invariable through these changes is the essence of the phenomena in question.” (p. 70) In the instance of the clown in the crowd idea, its essence has been created collectively over time from mental “scraps” that contain form, feeling, and color. Thus, in the act of perceiving various aspects of the finished image such as a tear, a sigh, an expression of loneliness, deep subconscious feelings of all viewers, from which the image initially came, are stirred. This cognitive effect of identification may come about, at least partially, through the mirror neuron system, in which the brain of the observer is both similar to and different from the brain of the observed. According to Jaffe (2007), this complex process involves, among other things, the ability to make “self-other distinctions” and “the capacity to regulate one’s…emotions …”. (p.23) Thus, in creating the clown in the crowd, reflective consciousness may have played a role, providing a certain coherence in combining the “scraps”. Merleau-Ponty states,“ …reflection…is an attempt to understand…It is not the passive attitude of a subject who watches himself live but rather the active effort of a subject who grasps the meaning of his experience.” (p. 64) In this case, the experience is at once deeply internal, self-conscious, and socially collective.
Representing the Figurative Image
Modell (2003) has described a two-system paradigm for emotion characterizing the direction of its experience. He states, “The self is not isolated. Feelings are in the service of two different functional systems…once pertaining to individual psychology and feelings as internal perceptions, and the other describing feelings as communication. (p.165) Presumably, the I Clown has been created by humanity, utilizing these two modes as a kind of play activity. Modell ( 2003) states, “ Bateson suggested that playing exists within a frame…within it, individuals are free to explore a wide range of emotion.” (p. 140) In addition, Modell states, “The context of play presumes a measure of safety, so feelings are at least temporarily delinked from homeostatic requirements of survival. The context of the environmental surround thus influences the complexity of consciousness. Safe environments expand consciousness.” (p. 140) The safe environment discussed here is a collective cognitive space where conscious and subconscious mental processes and mental structures are free to intermingle. In this space, reflection always exerts some control in order to construct an intelligible idea. Here, the idea is the I Clown, which has assumed a metaphoric structure in the form of a timeless representation, the clown in the crowd. In this idea, “the clown” and “the crowd” refer to two dimensions of self, namely the irrational “I” of self (the clown) and the rational “I” of self (the crowd). These dimensions come together to produce nuanced associations having to do with simultaneous need and constraint . This metaphoric tension can be expressed visually, as well as in words. Gibbs (1994) writes, “…real-world scenes can convey powerful metaphorical messages…For example, we understand Taxi Driver in metaphorical terms as referring to the loneliness of individuals …struggling to make sense of their lives in the vast urban jungle…Like verbal metaphors, cinematic metaphors present one idea in terms of another …” (pp. 184-185) Thus, like the film Taxi Driver, the I Clown presumably contains visual imagery at its expressive core.
The following analyses include “clown imagery” from the literary arts. In three poems, creative representations of the I Clown are introduced in terms of literary portrayals of constraint and need. These poems include “Cloony The Clown” by Shel Silverstein (1981), “The Country Clown” by John Trumbull (1820), and Clown’s Houses” by Edith Sitwell (1918).
Analyses
In all three poems, the source domain includes the crowd or collective self, the visual gestalt or clown him-or herself, and the psychological distance that divides them. The target domain includes the duality of sense/nonsense that exists as a “whole” of human nature, as well as the human need to express this duality of nature in a constrained way. This latter domain takes form as particular instances of creative imagery.
“Cloony the Clown”
Here, constraint and need are expressed as opposite feeling structures and particular instances of absurd behavior. For example, when Cloony feels good the crowd feeling bad, and when Cloony feels bad the crowd feels good. “His shoes were too big and his hat was too small (absurdity) /But he just wasn’t, just wasn’t funny at all.” (opposing feelings) “He was floppy and sloppy and skinny and tall, (absurdity)/ But he just wasn’t, just wasn’t full at all.” (opposing feelings) “And every time he did a trick, (absurdity)/ Everyone felt a little sick.” (opposing feelings) “And every time he told a joke, (absurdity)/ Folks sighed as if their hearts were broke.” (opposing feelings) The poem ends with Cloony by himself, separated from the crowd. “While Cloony stood in the circus tent,”/ With his head dropped down and his shoulders bent.” (opposing feelings) “And while the world laughed outside./ Cloony the Clown sat down and cried.” (opposing feelings)
“The Country Clown”
In this poem, the beginning lines express constraint and need through physical proximity and odd dress and behavior. “Bred in distant woods, the clown/ Brings all his country airs to town;” (proximity). Some middle lines of the poem include images of physical proximity and odd demeanor and dress as well. “The stiffen’d gait, the drawling tone, (oddity) /By which his native place is known” (proximity) and “The proud displays of awkward dress, (oddity)/ That all the country fop express” (proximity). These lines of followed by colorful physical descriptions such as “The silver buckle, dread to view, (oddity) / O’ershadowing all the clumsy shoe; (oddity). In the last third or so of the poem, there are again elements of constraint and need. “Poor Dick! Though first thy airs provoke (oddity) / The obstreperous laugh and scornful joke …” (proximity). … “Thy varied dress shall quickly show (oddity) /At once the spendthrift and the beau. (proximity). These two lines suggest that the clown sees him-or herself among the crowd in a new way that does not diminish the psychological distance between them.
“Clown’s Houses”
In this poem, the clown in the crowd or I Clown is portrayed as a cluster of houses situated somewhere far away. The houses are a metonymic symbol of a certain clown stereotype using physical and psychological features to capture it. Here, constraint and need are expressed as a subjective feelings of psychological distance felt by some other kind of being, and disturbingly odd looks and behaviors. The following middle line introduces the houses as symbolic extensions coming from within the “veiled eyes” of the “Pierrot moon” whose “…face is more white than sin,/ Black-masked…” (oddity) Parts of the houses figuratively portray the stirrings within the soul of the clown. “Tall houses, like a hopeless prayer (oddity)/ They cleave the sly dumb air. (oddity) “Blind are those houses, paper-thin (oddity)/ Old shadows hid therein, (oddity)/ With sly and crazy movements creep (oddity)/ Like Marionettes, and weep. (oddity). In the last lines, psychological distance is initially felt by some other kind of being who enters a house. “The rooms are vast as Sleep within;/When once I ventured in, (subjective distance)/ Chill Silence, like a surging sea,/ Slowly enveloped me.” (subjective distance) This last line suggests a sudden diminishing of psychological distance in which the “other being” is overtaken by the “clown soul”.
Conclusion
The highly symbolic I Clown, is a testament to the ability of the mind to simultaneously embrace and reject itself, functioning as “a part and apart” at the same time. One reason the clown in the crowd metaphor can be so unsettling such as in the poem Clown‘s Houses, may have to do with the workings of constraint/need dynamics. It may be that the psychological distance between the clown and the crowd, the fool and non fool, becomes so diminished as to be incapable of integrating the nature of both selves into one image complex.
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